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Law Summary
Freedom Is to Confinement as Twilight Is to
Dusk: The Unfortunate Logic of Sexual
Predator Statutes
I. INTRODUCTION
The "nature versus nurture" argument thrives in the literature on deviant
n
sexual behavior.
' Many believe that sexual abuse during childhood leads to
predatory behavior later on.2 Others believe that sexual violence, most ofwhich
males still perpetrate, 3 is a direct result of societal forces and socialization.'
Others, who evaluate this phenomenon from a physiological perspective, believe
that imbalances in brain chemicals cause the behavior.5 There may even be
evidence that organic brain dysfunction results in sexual aggression. 6 There is
no indication, however, that the source must be either entirely nature or nurture;
it is more likely that there are numerous factors that interact and lead to a
pathology of sexual aggression.7 Whatever the cause, predatory sexual behavior'

1. See, e.g., JONA. SHAw, M.D., SEXUALAGGRESSION 12-24 (American Psychiatric
Press, Inc. 1999).
2. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 157 (1994) (The defense
proffered, as a mitigating factor, evidence that the defendant's violent sexual behavior
"reflected serious mental disorders that stemmed from years of neglect and extreme
sexual and physical abuse."); see also Ted Shaw et al., Cognitive-BehavioralTreatment
StrategiesforAdolescentSex Offenders: The IntegratedModel,in SEXUALAGGRESSION
275, 278 (Jon A. Shaw ed., 1999) (citing research that found that adolescents who
committed "serious sexual offenses" had high frequencies of past abuse).
3. Currently, of all the sexually violent predators who are confined in the United
States, only four are female. One ofthese four is confined in Farmington, Missouri. Geri
L. Dreiling, Fallen Angel, RIVERFRONT TvIEs (St. Louis), Jan. 9, 2002,
http://www.riverfronttimes.com/issues/2002-01-09/feature.html/print.htm.
4. Judith V. Becker & William D. Murphy, What We Know and Do Not Know
About Assessing and Treating Sex Offenders, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 116, 120
(1998).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 121.
8. In this Summary, the phrases "sex offender," "sexually violent predator," and
"sexual predator" are all intended to describe an individual who has been adjudged as
one who engages in sexually violent behavior against an unwilling person due in part to
a mental defect.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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is a pervasive problem in American society,9 and both the legal and mental
health communities have sought a balance between punishment and treatment
of sexual predators."0
The legal community's response to predatory sexual behavior has resulted
in the proliferation of numerous statutes specifically dealing with offenders
whose crimes seem to be linked to a mental abnormality." The first of these
statutes began to appear in the 1930s and they resurfaced at the end of the
twentieth century.' 2 The recent legislation has resulted in an increase in the
3
number of mentally abnormal sex offenders among prison populations.'
The mental health community's response to predatory sexual behavior has
evolved from the draconian remedy of castration to the use of cognitive,
behavioral, and drug therapy, each of which is frequently used to treat
individuals who experience non-sexual and/or non-criminal psychiatric and
psychological disorders. This Law Summary begins with a brief overview of the
clinical treatment of sexual predators. The clinical background section enhances
the discussion of legislation and jurisprudence because the adjudication of an
individual as a sexually violent predator, in many states, involves testimony from
medical experts and findings as to the individual's ability to control his behavior,
and, consequently, the likelihood that he will re-offend if he is released. This
Law Summary then describes the legislative and judicial responses to sexual
predators as well as the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of sexually
violent predator statutes and its declaration of their constitutionality. Finally, the
last section illuminates potential flaws in the Court's and the legislatures'
reasoning and proposes one possible solution.

9. See http://www.stopitnow.com/about.htm].
10. Scholars have stated that the basis for sexually violent predator legislation is
that "[t]he 'sexual psychopath' is neither normal nor 'legally insane' and for that reason,
requires special consideration, both for his own sake and for the safety of society. The
purposes of the... statutes are thus twofold: to protect society and to rehabilitate the
offender." John Pratt, The Rise and Fall of Homophobia and Sexual Psychopath
Legislation in PostwarSociety, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 25, 26 (1998); see also
Becker & Murphy, supranote 4, at 116. The legislation is supported by the assumption
that once the offender is treated, he may be returned safely to the community.
11. Becker & Murphy, supra note 4, at 116.
12. See Pratt,supra note 10, at 26.
13. Becker & Murphy, supranote 4, at 116. Legislation resulted in a forty-eight
percent increase of mentally abnormal incarcerated sex offenders in prison populations
between 1988 and 1990. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/9
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II. CLINICAL BACKGROUND 14

A. ClinicalAssessment ofDeviant Sexual Behaviors
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the creation of a multi-disciplinary model
of sex offender treatment is the variance among violent sex offenders.15 Just as
there may be many causes for sexually aggressive behavior, there is not one
simple diagnosis for offenders who commit acts of sexual aggression. "'Sexually
violent predators ("SVPs") may be diagnosed with a panoply of psychiatric
disorders. The fourth edition oftheDiagnosticandStatisticalManualofMental
Disorders("DSM-IV") is the general diagnostic tool used by practitioners in the
field of psychiatry, including forensic psychiatry. 7 The DSM-IV outlines
diagnostic criteria for mental disorders in order to facilitate communication and
uniformity of diagnoses among practitioners." Disorders that are characterized
by "recurrent, intense sexual urges, fantasies, or behaviors that involve unusual
objects, activities, or situations and cause clinically significant distress or
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas offunctioning"' 9 are
called "paraphilias."2 ° In order to fall into this DSM-IV classification, there must
be a causal connection between the urges and diminished functioning.2'

14. This Part is intended to provide the reader a general overview so that he or she

may better understand the legal issues in relation to the medical issues. It is by no means
an exhaustive account of the issues present in the treatment of sex offenders. It is
provided here for background purposes only.
15. RONALD M. HOLMES, SEX CRIMES 107 (2d ed. 1991) (citing the National

Institute of Corrections sex offender typologies). Type one is comprised of first-time
offenders who attribute the crime to stress or substance abuse. Id. The second type is
the chronic offender who exhibits the most antisocial behavior. Id. The third and final
type are chronic offenders who are "inept" and may be "mentally slow." Id.; see also

Becker & Murphy, supranote 4, at 118 (stating that even the subgroups of paraphilias
contain "a great deal of heterogeneity"). But cf. WILLIAM E. PRENDERGAST, TREATING
SEX OFFENDERS INCoRRECTIoNALINsTrTUTIoNs AND OUTPATIENT CLINICS: AGUIDETO
CLINICAL PRACTICE 221 (1991) (stating that irrespective of offense, sex offenders share
major personality traits).

16. Becker & Murphy, supra,note 4, at 117.
17. Becker & Murphy, supra, note 4, at 117.
18. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: TEXT
REVISION xxiii (Michael B. First ed., 4th ed. 2000).
19. Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
20. The paraphilias fall into the DSM-IV's categorization of sexual and gender
identity disorders. Id. There are numerous other categorizations in the DSM-IV,
including personality disorders, eating disorders, and sleep disorders. See generally id.
21. It would be remiss to discuss aberrant sexual behavior without recognizing the
difficulty an individual who experiences deviant urges might have in confronting his or

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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Individuals who have been adjudged sexually violent predators are
frequently diagnosed with one of the paraphilias2 which include exhibitionism,'
pedophilia, and sexual sadism.2" Mood and personality disorders, including
antisocial personality disorder2 6 and depression,27 however, have also, along with

her illness by seeking medical help. The fear ofrepercussions and embarrassment might
deter these individuals from seeking treatment.
22. See id. at 566-76; see also HOLMES, supranote 15, at 17-35.
23. See generally Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002). The Cranedissent noted
that "[t]hough exhibitionism alone would not support classification as a sexual predator,
apsychologist concluded that the two [disorders-antisocial disorder and exhibitionism]
in combination did place respondent's condition within the range of disorders covered
by the [Sexually Violent Predator Act]" based on the defendant's particular propensity
for aggression and disregard for the rights of others. Id. at 416-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Exhibitionism is a paraphilia. DSM-IV, supra note 18, at 569. The DSM-IV describes
the diagnostic criteria for exhibitionism as:
A. Over a period of at least 6 months, recurrent, intense sexually arousing
fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving the exposure of one's genitals
to an unsuspecting stranger.
B. The person has acted on these sexual urges, or the sexual urges or
fantasies cause marked distress or interpersonal difficulty.
Id.
24. See In re Salcedo, 34 S.W.3d 862, 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). The DSM-IV
diagnostic criteria for pedophilia are:
A. Over a period of at least 6 months, recurrent, intense sexually arousing
fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving sexual activity with a
prepubescent child or children (generally age 13 years or younger).
B. The person has acted on these sexual urges, or the sexual urges or
fantasies cause marked distress or interpersonal difficulty.
C. The person is at least age 16 years and at least 5 years older than the child
or children in Criterion A.
DSM-IV, supra note 18, at 571-72.
25. See State ex rel. Nixon v. Askren, 27 S.W.3d 834, 836 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
The diagnostic criteria for sexual sadism are:
A. Over a period of at least 6 months, recurrent, intense sexually arousing
fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving acts (real, not simulated) in
which the psychological or physical suffering (including humiliation) of the
victim is sexually exciting to the person.
B. The person has acted on these sexual urges with a nonconsenting person,
or the sexual urges or fantasies cause marked distress or interpersonal
difficulty.
DSM-IV, supra note 18, at 574.
26. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407,411 (2002). Antisocial personality disorder
is not a paraphilia, but a personality disorder. DSM-IV, supra note 18, at 701. In the
general population, approximately three percent of males and one percent of females
suffer from it. Id. at 704. The disorder is far more prevalent in prison populations than
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/9
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other paraphilias, been reported as causing the volitional impairment that is
associated with inability to resist aberrant sexual urges.
Although these disorders are associated with defendants who commit sex
crimes, it is important to note that many individuals may possess some of the
psychological features of one who commits sex crimes (i.e., he or she may have
deviant sexual urges),28 but the individual may not act upon the urges or the
urges may not interfere with that person's daily routine.29 For example, an
individual may have sexual fantasies involving the humiliation of a sexual
partner. This is one element of sexual sadism,30 but the individual would not
suffer from sexual sadism, unless and until he or she acted on those urges with
a non-consenting partner or the fantasies caused marked distress or interpersonal
difficulty." Additionally, many SVPs may suffer from other mental illnesses
that are not paraphilias and are not sexual in nature. 2 Likewise, not all violent

among society at large. Crane, 534 U.S. at 412 (citing study that concluded that forty
to sixty percent ofmales in prison populations are diagnosable with antisocial personality
disorder). Some of its diagnostic features are:
A. [A] pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation ofthe rights of others
occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) ofthe following:
(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors
as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest...
(4) irritability and aggressiveness as indicated by repeated physical
fights or assaults
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others...
(7) lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing
having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another...
C. There is evidence of Conduct Disorder... with onset before age 15 years.
DSM-IV, supra note 18, at 706. Conduct disorder is a persistent behavior pattern
characterized by at least three of the following behaviors: (1) aggression to people or
animals; (2) destruction of property; (3) deceitfulness or theft; or (4) serious rule
violations. Id. at 98-99, 706.
27. See Askren, 27 S.W.3d at 836. The clinician in this case reported "major
depression" as a mental abnormality making it more likely that the defendant would reoffend. Unlike the paraphilias, depression is a mood disorder. There are a variety of
disorders that could be described by the -label "major depression," including major
depressive episode; major depressive disorder, single episode; and major depressive
disorder, recurrent. Regardless of the type of depression, the patient who suffers from
it will conform to the diagnostic criteria for major depressive episode. DSM-IV, supra
note 18, at 356, 375-76.
28. See generally Becker & Murphy, supranote 4.
29. See DSM-IV, supranote 18, at 568.
30. See DSM-IV, supra note 18, at 574.
31. DSM-IV, supra note 18, at 574.
32. A number of the offenders who have been adjudicated sexually violent
predators were diagnosed with anti-social personality disorder in addition to aparaphilia.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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sex crimes will fall into the tenets of sexually violent predator legislation.33 For
example, individuals who commit rapes against persons who are of the age of
majority would not necessarily be classified as sexually violent predators under
the current legislation even though their crimes are both sexual and violent in
nature.34

Only when the crime is associated with a diagnosable mental

abnormality" which makes it difficult or impossible for the offender to control
his behavior will the offender be labeled a sexually violent predator.
B. Treatment Modelsfor Sexual Offenders
A discussion of treatment for sexually violent predators is incomplete
without a summary of the various treatment models that have been utilized in the
past with SVPs, particularly in light of the treatment justifications for the current
commitment statutes.36 Initially, it is important to note that treatment is the only
viable approach to sexual predators; a cure is beyond the mental health
community's current knowledge.37

Professor Holmes has stated that "[n]o

responsible person would say that we cure sex offenders .... We give them
tools to control their deviance." 3 These tools may include behavioral therapy,
39
cognitive therapy, cognitive-behavioral therapy, and medical or drug therapy.
Behavioral therapy, which is commonly identified as conditioning, is a system

See, e.g., Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 256 (2001); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407,
411 (2002).
33. Becker & Murphy, supra note 4, at 118.
34. There is a fine distinction between SVPs who are diagnosed with paraphilias
and individuals who suffer from antisocial personality disorder and commit sex crimes
as part of the pattern of disregard for the rights of others. The distinction is this: a

person who suffers from antisocial personality disorder may simply seize an opportunity
to commit a crime (sexual or otherwise) as part of a general disregard for individuals or
simply to commit an act because it defies the law. An individual who suffers from a
paraphilia, however, does not engage in such acts simply to defy authority. The precise
cause ofthe behavior is not known. See supranote 1; see also supranote 26 discussing
antisocial personality disorder.
35. Cf FallenAngel, supranote 3 (The perpetrator was adjudged asexually violent

predator based upon her diagnosis with HIV and herperforming oral sex on a minor child
on one occasion. She was deemed an SVP despite the fact that she stopped performing

oral sex on the boy because she thought it was "nasty.").
36. See Pratt,supranote 10, at 26.
37. HOLMES, supra note 15, at 107; see also Janice K. Marques, How to Answer
the Question "Does Sex Offender Treatment Really Work" 14 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 437 (1999).

38. HOLMES, supra note 15, at 107.
39. HOLMES, supra note 15, at 107.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/9
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of rewards and punishments used to modify behavior.' For sex offenders, this
may include aversive conditioning,4 in which an offender's sexual arousal is
monitored as he or she is exposed to stimulus (e.g., pornographic photographs).42
Here, arousal is the unwanted behavior, and, if it occurs, the therapist will induce
a negative reinforcement (e.g., exposure to a noxious odor).43 Behavioral
therapy also includes the simple replacement ofharmful, maladaptive behaviors
with more positive ones. 44 When behavioral therapy takes this form, however,
the line between it and cognitive therapy becomes thin, in that the force of
cognitive therapy is working with the offender to change "his basic perception
of his own sex life and the world around him as it pertains to sex and his
interactions with others."4' This generally includes working with the offender
to develop coping mechanisms, such as anger management skills," sex education
and human sexuality classes,47 relaxation classes,4 and social skills classes.49
Cognitive-behavioral therapy 0 combines the theory of more positive thoughts
as developed in cognitive therapy, with the practice of using those thoughts to
make it through difficult situations when the subject is faced with a sexual

40. HOLMES, supranote 15, at 107; see also DAVID G. MYERS, PSYCHOLOGY 55253 (4th ed. 1995). Cognitive-behavioral therapy has two components. Id. at 553. The

cognitive element is based on the belief that negative thoughts and feelings about one's
self (called catastrophizing) shape beliefs. The behavioral aspect involves developing
replacement of the negative thoughts and beliefs with new, positive thoughts and
practicing this technique. Id.
41. Aversive conditioning is defined as a "type of counterconditioning that
associates an unpleasant state (such as nausea) with an unwanted behavior (such as
drinking alcohol)." MYERS, supra note 40, at G-1.
42. HOLMES, supranote 15, at 112.
43. HOLMES, supranote 15, at 112. Less severe cases ofsexuallyviolentresponses
may not require such drastic treatment.
44. MYERS, supranote 40, at 546.
45. HOLMES, supranote 15, at 112.

46. HOLMES,supranote 15, at 113.
47. Marques, supranote 37, at 440.
48. Marques, supranote 37, at 440.
49. Marques, supranote 37, at 440.
50. MYERS, supranote 40, at 553 ("Cognitive-behavioral therapy aims to make
people aware of their irrational negative thinking and replace it with new ways of
thinking and talking, andto practice the more positive approach in every day settings.").

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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stimulus."' This method is fairly common in the literature and has enjoyed some
limited success.52
Where the use of psychological models of therapy is ineffective, 3 or where
the need for results is immediate, psychiatric drugs may offer solutions more
promising than cognitive or behavioral approaches.54 These may include the use
of anti-depressants,55 such as Prozac, to alter the offender's mood or the use of
antiandrogens to lower testosterone levels.56 The use of drug therapy was
instituted as an alternative to the somewhat draconian remedy of castration,
which, until the 1980s, was a recommended means of preventing future
offenses.5 The effect of these drugs is to reduce the "frequency and intensity of

51. For a review ofthe efficacy of one cognitive-behavioral treatment program, see
Marques, supra note 37, at 441-44. Subjects in the program had two years of intensive
treatment involving three ninety-minute sessions per week and post-release follow-up.
Id. The treatment group in this study differs slightly from the description of a sexually
violent predator under Kansas and Missouri law. Id. The subjects were either rapists or
child molesters, and some were not convicted of any sexual crime; their involvement in
the program was supported by ample evidence that a sexual crime occurred, though there
was no successful prosecution. Id. After two years ofcognitive-behavioral therapy and
at least five years at risk (post-release), Marques found that overall, those offenders who
had participated in the treatment re-offended with about the same frequency as those who
had not. Id.
52. See generally PRENDERGAST, supra note 15; Marques, supra note 37;
HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT: ISSUES, THEORIES, AND TREATMENT OF THE OFFENDER

363-85 (W.L. Marshall et al. eds., 1990).
53. Debra A. Katz, PsychopharmacholigicalInterventions with Adolescent and
Adult Sex Offenders, in SEXUAL AGGRESSION 305, 306 (Jon A. Shaw ed., 1999).
54. Id. According to Dr. Katz, who wrote about sexual offender treatment in
adolescents, there are four situations in which the use of drug therapy may be preferable:
Because the etiology of sexual aggression is so complex, psychopharmaceutical treatment has been utilized for 1) offenders who have been
unresponsive to other treatment modalities, 2) offenders who pose an
immediate risk to society and must be prevented from reoffending, 3)
offenders with comorbid psychiatric disorders that may have an impact on
their sexual offending (e.g., [obsessive compulsive disorder], [attention
deficit/hyperactivity disorder], intermittent explosive disorder), and, by far the
most common usage, 4) offenders with paraphilias, or persistent, deviant
sexual urges, in which the goal of treatment is to reduce sexually deviant
behavior by suppressing the sexual drive.
Id.
55. Id. at 316.
56. Id. at 309.
57. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/9
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sexual urges in general rather than by influencing the nature of those urges""8 as
is done in cognitive and behavioral therapy.
There is more controversy surrounding the use of hormone-altering drugs,
aside from the obvious ethical implications. The administration of some mood
altering or hormone adjusting drugs has been associated with numerous severe
side effects. The use of Depo-Provera, for example, a hormone altering drug
typically used for birth control, has been associated with effects like diabetes,
depression, high blood pressure, and fatigue.59 Furthermore, practitioners may,
in some cases, consider drug therapy the best option only to have the offender
decline treatment. This puts the practitioner in the position of having to decide
whether to medicate the offender against his will. This issue, too, has broad
constitutional and ethical implications.
Although the pathology of sexual predators is shrouded in mystery, one
truth has become evident: treatment programs must be all-inclusive to
accommodate the multi-causal nature of sex offenses." Furthermore, because
it is summarily assumed that an offender will continue to have deviant urges,
aftercare 6' is necessary to ensure that the offender continues to utilize the tools
he learned in treatment. It also seems clear that, just as deviant behavior has
many causes, so too must the treatment of that behavior be multi-faceted. The
mental health community's response has, in the past decade, evolved into a more
humane approach than was taken in the past and which considers the pathology
of each individual and tailors an appropriate response. The inquiry now turns to
a consideration of whether the legal community's approach has been similarly
progressive and what the implications of that approach are for society at large.
Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Legislation
Just as the clinical approach to dealing with predatory sexual behavior has
evolved throughout the twentieth century, so has the legislative approach. 62 The
greatest proliferation of statutes intended to deal with the problem of sexual
predators occurred in the middle of last century when twenty-six states enacted
sexual psychopath legislation. 3 The District of Columbia participated in this

58. Id.
59. HOLMES, supra note 15, at 113.
60. See Becker & Murphy, supranote 4, at 121.
61. See generally PRENDERGAST, supra note 15.
62. See Pratt,supra note 10, at 25-26.
63. Pratt, supra note 10, at 26 ("Between 1937 and 1960, 26 states in the United
States introduced sexual psychopath laws.").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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new wave of legislation with the enactment of its Sexual Psychopath Act in
1948. 64 The purpose of the Act, according to the Senate Committee on the
District of Columbia, was to provide a "humane and practical approach to the
problem of persons unable to control their sexual emotions."'65 The Act also
allowed for the commitment of a perpetrator before or after trial, but did not
require that there be a criminal charge.66 Further, the language of the Act
specifically linked lack of volitional control to compromising public safety.67
This legislation, like today's legislation, relies strongly upon the presumption
that individuals who commit sexual crimes are unable to control their behavior.
The 1960s and 1970s brought the repeal of many of the laws passed earlier
in the century.68 In the 1990s, however, there was renewed interest in how
society addresses the problem of sex offenders, caused in part by the tragic
disappearance of three little girls in New Jersey.69 Two statutory mechanisms
have resulted from this concern:7 (1) offender registration/community
notification statutes and (2) statutes allowing for the commitment of sexual
offenders to mental health facilities.7 Currently, more than fifteen states have
some type of civil commitment statutes for sexually violent offenders.72

64. See Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d 964, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
65. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 80-1377, at 5 (2d. Sess. 1948)).
66. Millard,406 F.2d at 967.
67. The the 1967 version of the Act states:
The term "sexual psychopath" means a person, not insane, who by a course
of repeated misconduct in sexual matters has evidenced such lack of power
to control his sexual impulses as to be dangerous to other persons because he
is likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the
objects of his desire.
Id. (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3503(1) (1967) (currently § 22-3803(1) (2001))).
68. Pratt, supranote 10, at 38. Many believe this was a result of the general deregulation of morality.
69. See Sheila A. Campbell, Note, Battling Sex Offenders: Is Megan's Law an
Effective Means ofAchieving PublicSafety?, 19 SETON HALLLEGIS.J. 519 n.3. In 1994
in New Jersey, three separate, tragic incidents focused public attention on released sex
offenders. Id. Each of the victims was a young girl, aged six or seven, raped and killed
by a convicted offender who had been released. Id. One of the girls, Megan Kanka, was
the namesake of "Megan's law," which requires offenders to register when they are
returned to the community. Id.; see also Pratt, supra note 10, at 35 (referring to a
researcher's 1938 remarks about the "mass hysteria" caused by the "considerable number
of reported criminal cases in which children or young women have been attacked").
70. Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A TherapeuticJurisprudence
Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 505, 508 (1998).
71. Id.
72. See The Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, at http://www.atsa.
com/ppcivilcommit.html.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/9
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Washington,73 Kansas, Missouri,74 Iowa, and Illinois have each enacted sexual
predator legislation that allows for the commitment ofsexually violent predators.
Kansas adopted its version in 1994,"5 and this act was the first in the modem
wave of sexually violent predator legislation to go before the United States
Supreme Court. It has done so twice now with arguably inconsistent results.
The Kansas legislature enacted that state's sexually violent predator
legislation in part because it found the existing civil commitment statutes to be
insufficient to cover this group of offenders. It stated:
The legislature finds that there exists an extremely dangerous group of
sexually violent predators who have a mental abnormality or
personality disorder and who are likely to engage in repeat acts of
sexual violence if not treated for their mental abnormality or
personality disorder. Because the existing civil commitment
procedures under K.S.A. 59-2901 et seq. and amendments thereto are
inadequate to address the special needs of sexually violent predators
and the risks they present to society, the legislature determines that a
separate involuntary civil commitment process for the potentially
long-term control, care, and treatment ofsexually violent predators is
necessary. The legislature also determines that because of the nature
of the mental abnormalities or personality disorder from which
sexually violent predators suffer, and the dangers they present, it is
necessary to house involuntarily committed sexually violent predators
in an environment separate from persons involuntarily committed
under K.S.A. 59-2901 et seq. and amendments thereto. 6
The basic assumption behind the Act is clear from this provision; individuals
who commit sexually violent crimes pose such a great threat to society that they
must live separately77 and receive treatment for their condition. The separate
treatment issue in and of itself could present complicated constitutional issues.
The Act contains numerous safeguards, however, designed to protect offenders
from its overzealous application. First, when the attorney general files a petition
with the court prior to an offender's release, the judge must determine that there
is probable cause to believe that the named person is a sexually violent
73. See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 254 (2001).

74. The Missouri law is patterned after the Kansas SVP Act. See Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 632.480-.513 (2000); see also In re Salcedo, 34 S.W.3d 862, 864-66 (Mo. Ct. App.
2000) (outline of civil commitment procedure under the Missouri Act).
75. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
76. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994).

77. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (1994) (requiring that offenders convicted
under the Act be segregated from other individuals in social service care).
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predator.78 Second, at the probable cause hearing, the offender is entitled to
counsel, to present a case on his behalf, and to cross examine the state's
witnesses.79 Further, the offender is entitled to access all the documents filed
with the court. The proceedings go forward only if the court finds probable
cause to believe the offender is a sexually violent predator.81 A jury will be
sworn at the "demand" of any of the parties or the judge. 2 The factfinder, be it
jury orjudge, must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender is an SVP.13
Finally, if a jury makes the determination, it must be by a unanimous verdict."
Although all of the safeguards for a criminal procedure are present in the SVP
Act, it is contained in the Kansas Probate Code. Soon after the Act was codified,
the United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to explore its contours.85
B. Case Law
1. Kansas v. Hendricks
The state of Kansas utilized its Sexually Violent Predator Act for the first
time in 1994.6 After ten years of confinement, Leroy Hendricks was scheduled
for release to a halfway house. 7 In 1984, he had been convicted of taking
"indecent liberties" with two thirteen year-old boys.88 Prior to his incarceration
in 1984, Hendricks had been confined89 on five occasions for five separate sex

78. Id. § 59-29a05(a).
79. Id. § 59-29a05(c).
80. Id.
81. See id. §59-29a02(a) (defining a sexually violent predator as "any person who
has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from
a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in
repeat acts of sexual violence").
82. Id. § 59-29a06.
83. Id. § 59-29a07(a).
84. Id.
85. This Law Summary focuses on the United States Supreme Court jurisprudence
because two recent cases from the Court, Hendricksand Crane,have set the parameters
by which all other sexual predator statutes must abide. Additionally, given the novelty
of the statutes, there is very little interpretive jurisprudence, particularly in Missouri.
86. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997). Justice Thomas wrote an
exhaustive opinion for Hendricks. In the interest of space, only the most relevant
portions are discussed herein.
87. Id. at 353.
88. Id.
89. It appears from the Supreme Court decision that Hendricks was incarcerated
four times and confined to a psychiatric hospital another time. Id. at 354.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/9
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crimes against children, and admitted to engaging in more criminal sex acts than
the acts for which he was confined." His history of sexually abusing children
spanned almost three decades.9
Pursuant to the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act ("Act"), the State of
Kansas sought to commit Hendricks for psychiatric treatment in lieu of placing
him in a halfway house.' At the trial phase, Hendricks testified before a jury
that he could not control his urge to molest children, particularly when he felt
'
stressed, and the only way for him to stop his abusive behavior was "to die."93
9
9
4
He also stated, in colorful language, that treatment was ineffective. " The jury
found Hendricks was an SVP, arguably as the result of his own testimony, and
committed him.96
2. Constitutional Issues
Hendricks' subsequent appeal did not argue his adjudication as a sexually
violent predator, nor did it argue that the trial court erred by finding that
pedophilia is a "mental abnormality." Instead, Hendricks claimed that the
Kansas act violated his Due Process97 rights and violated both the Double
Jeopardy9" and Ex Post Facto" clauses of the United States Constitution. 0 The
Kansas Supreme Court found that the Act did, in fact, violate Hendricks'
substantive due process rights, but the Court did not address the ex post facto or
double jeopardy claims.' ' The State of Kansas then appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. 2 The Supreme Court's decision, which found the
Kansas act unconstitutional as applied, is vitally important to understanding legal
perceptions of mental illness. Its declaration of the constitutionality of post-

90. Id. at 354-55.
91. The first conviction was based on a 1955 offense. Most recently, Hendricks
was convicted in 1984. Id. at 353-55.
92. Id. at 354.
93. Id. at 355.
94. At one point, Hendricks told the state's physician that "treatment is bullshit."
95. Id. The Supreme Court opinion indicates that Hendricks underwent treatment
on three occasions. In 1965, after treatment attempts, he was deemed to be "safe at
large." In 1967, after another offense, he refused treatment for his pedophilia. In 1972,
he began a treatment program, but subsequently abandoned it. Id. at 354-55.

96. Id. at 355-56.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
98. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
100. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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release confinement, although seemingly counterintuitive, has set the standard
and provided the terms of discourse for the confinement of sexual predators.
The opinion, which Justice Thomas authored, begins with the axiom that
liberty rights are not absolute and can be overridden where a public safety
interest is served."
A commitment statute that comports with "proper
procedures and evidentiary standards""' likely will be found constitutional. The
question the Court faced, then, was whether the Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act met the procedural and evidentiary standards. The Court held that
it did. 1' In so doing, the Court compared the Kansas statute with statutes of a
similar nature that the Court had considered before" 6 and stated that the
important component of the statutes is that each requires an additional finding
that dangerousness is related to mental abnormality.0 7 Justice Thomas stated:

The Kansas Act is plainly of a kind with these other civil commitment
statutes: It requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links
that finding to the existence of a "mental abnormality" or "personality
disorder" that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to
control his dangerous behavior. The precommitment requirement of
a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" is consistent with the
requirements of these other statutes that we have upheld in that it
narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are
unable to control their dangerousness.0 8
Justice Thomas then delineated two factors present in Hendricks' case that,
taken together, satisfied due process: (1) Hendricks' purported inability to
control his behavior and (2) the medical community's predictions about his
proclivity to engage in violent sexual behaviors." 9 He stated:
Hendricks ...conceded that, when he becomes "stressed out," he

cannot "control the urge" to molest children. This admitted lack of
volitional control, coupled with a prediction of future dangerousness,
adequately distinguishes Hendricks from other dangerous persons who
are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal

103. Id. at 356-57.
104. Id. at 357.
105. Id.
106. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,323 (1993); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364,
365 (1986); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 271-72 (1940).

107. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
108. Id. (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 360.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/9
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proceedings. Hendricks' diagnosis as apedophile, which qualifies as
a "mental abnormality" under the Act, thus plainly suffices for due
process purposes.' 10
Thus, the due process standard for commitment of sexually violent offenders
appeared to be set. As long as the state could support a petition for post-release
commitment with a showing of lack of volitional control and evidence of a
probability of future offenses, itwas acting within the confines ofdue process.",
Although the Kansas Supreme Court declined to address the ex post facto
and double jeopardy claims, the United States Supreme Court did address
them." 2 The force of Hendricks' arguments regarding these claims was that
Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act, although contained in the Kansas
Probate Code," 3 created a criminal proceeding and that commitment under the
Act was synonymous with punishment."' Resorting to simple theories of
statutory interpretation," 5 the Court found that the legislature did not intend to
create and did not in fact create a criminal procedure when it created the Act." 6
Still, according to the Court, Hendricks could have prevailed in his assertion that
the Act was punitive had he been able to prove that "the statutory scheme [is] so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention to deem
it 'civil.""' 7 Evidence that the Act served a retributive or deterrent function
would have supported Hendricks' charge that the Act was punitive in nature and,
therefore, violated double jeopardy."' The Court gave three primary reasons
why Hendricks' argument failed. First, the use of prior conduct and mental
condition served evidentiary purposes only; they were not used for purposes of

110. Id. (citations omitted). The American legal system has long recognized that
individuals should not be punished purely for their proclivities. See FED. R. EVID. 404
(making the defendant's propensities irrelevant). The United States Supreme Court,
however, has found that "[p]revious instances of violent behavior are an important
indicator of future violent tendencies." Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 (quoting Heller v.
Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. For a discussion ofpossible flaws in the Court's analysis, see infra notes 15783 and accompanying text.
112. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356, 360-61.
113. KAN. STAT. ANN. art. 29 (1994).
114. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.

115. The Court considered the Act's placement in the Probate Code, the title of
Article 29 of the probate code ("Care and Treatment for Mentally III
Persons") and the
description of what the Act creates ("civil commitment procedure"). Id.
116. Id.

117. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,248-49 (1980)) (alterations
inoriginal).
118. Id.at 361-62.
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determining culpability."1 9 Second, the language of the Act does not require a
criminal conviction.' 20 It clearly applies to individuals who were charged with
a sexually violent offense, whether or not a conviction resulted. Hence, if
applied as written, it simply could not be a double jeopardy violation' 2' because
individuals charged under the Act may never have had a trial. Third, the Court
stated that the lack of a scienter'" requirement is what has traditionally separated
civil and criminal proceedings.'" The Act does not require that a defendant have
knowledge or intent. It simply requires that the defendant have a mental
abnormality."2
The Court's ex post facto analysis used essentially the same reasoning."
Because the Act neither imposes punishment nor purports to, and because the
Act lacks retroactive effect, "its application does not raise ex post facto
126
concerns."
With these declarations, the Court, in keeping with the times, gave its
blessing to post-release commitment statutes that recognize mental abnormalities
as the cause of sexually violent behavior. For three years, Hendricks controlled
this issue. In 2002, however, ascertaining whether states comported with the
required evidentiary standards became markedly more difficult.

119. Id. at 362.
120. Id. The Act defines a sexually violent predator as "any person who has been
convicted of or chargedwith a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in repeat
acts of sexual violence." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (1994) (emphasis added).
12 1. The Supreme Court opinion contains a more exhaustive discussion of why the
Act does not violate double jeopardy. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369-70. That discussion
is excluded from this Summary because it is based upon the principle stated above:
where the Act is civil and non-punitive in nature there is no second prosecution. Hence,
double jeopardy does not apply.
122. "Scienter," as the Court used the term, indicates a knowing mental state. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

123.
124.
125.
126.

938 (7th ed. 1999).

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362.
Id.
Id. at 370.
Id.
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IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 127
In January 2002, the United States Supreme Court explored its previous
decision inHendricksand concluded that the language ofthe Kansas statute calls
for an additional finding that the sexually violent defendant is unable to control
his or her behavior."
The post-release commitment of Michael Crane, a
convicted sexual offender, was the catalyst for the State of Kansas' challenge to
the Kansas Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of Kansas' SVP Act.'I
Crane's conviction arose from two incidents that occurred the night of
January 6, 1993.30 First, Crane exposed himself to a tanning salon clerk.'3 ' He
then went to a video store, which was approximately six blocks away, and
waited until he was the only customer in the store. 32 When he was alone with
the video store clerk, he approached her from behind, lifted her off the ground,
and carried her away from the front door and window. 33 During a physical
struggle, Crane exposed his genitals to the video store clerk and made numerous
demands for oral sex. 34 At one point during the struggle, Crane placed his
hands around the clerk's neck and squeezed. 35 He also threatened to rape her.136
He then stopped suddenly and fled the scene. 137 At his criminal trial, Crane was
convicted of lewd and lascivious behavior for exposing himself to the tanning
salon clerk, 38 and he plead guilty to one count of aggravated sexual battery for
39
the incident at the video store.

127. Most recently, Jerry P. Inman, who was committed as an SVP for sex crimes
involving three teenage girls, became the first SVP to be released from Kansas' sexual
predator program. Dawn Bormann & Tony Rizzo, Ex-area man first to be released
completely from Kansas Sexual predatorprogram, KansasCity.com (Sept. 28, 2002),
http://www.kansascity.comr/mld/kansascity/news/4166951 (ast visited Oct. 10, 2002).
128. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 423 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at410-11.
130. State v. Crane, 918 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Kan. 1996).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1259.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. In re Crane, 7 P.3d285, 286 (Kan. 2000), vacatedsubnom. Kansas v. Crane,
534 U.S. 407 (2002).
139. Id. The plea agreement in this case represents a collateral use of SVP
legislation to restrain an SVP whose conviction under criminal law was less than what
the victim and the prosecution had hoped for. See infranote 179 and accompanying text
(describing how a Johnson City prosecutor accepted a lesser plea from the defendant with
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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After his sentence was served, the State of Kansas petitioned for Crane's
commitment and was initially successful at 'the district court level. Crane's
commitment was based, in part, upon psychiatric testimony that he suffered from
both exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder."4 The Kansas Supreme
Court reversed, however, finding that Crane's commitment violated his due
process rights.14' In arguing its case before the United States Supreme Court,
Kansas took the position that the Kansas Supreme Court misapplied Hendricks
by requiring a showing that a potential sexually violent predator is completely
unable to control his or her behavior. 42 The United States Supreme Court found
this element of the Kansas Supreme Court's approach unduly rigid, stating,
"[i]nsistence upon absolute lack of control would risk barring the civil
commitment of highly dangerous persons suffering severe mental
abnormalities."' 43 Nevertheless, the majority held that, in addition to Hendricks'
requirements of(1) a mental abnormality or personality disorder that (2) renders
an offender likely to commit future crimes, a third finding is required.'
The
final requirement, the majority held, is a finding that "the subject suffers from
an inability to control [his or her] behavior." 4 ' The degree to which lack of
volitional control must be demonstrated is unclear, although the Court
acknowledged that mathematical precision is unattainable."M Justice Breyer
stated:
It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in
controlling behavior. And this, when viewed in light of such features
of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity
of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the
dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality,
or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but
typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case."

the hope that the sexually violent predator act would prolong his confinement after his
incarceration ended). This collateral use ofthe statute presents additional constitutional
questions that no court has yet addressed. See infranotes 176-80 and accompanying text.
140. Crane, 534 U.S. at 411.
141. Inre Crane, 7 P.3d at 294.
142. Crane, 534 U.S. at 410.
143. Id. at 412.
144. Id. at 423 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
145. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
146. Id. at 412 (citing the now famous language from the American Psychiatric
Association's Statement on the Insanity Defense that "[t]he line between an irresistible
impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably no sharper than the difference between
twilight and dusk.").
147. Id. at 412.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/9
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Here, Justice Breyer set the nebulous constitutional standard for finding that the
subject is unable to control his behavior: serious difficulty in controlling
behavior taken in context with the remaining facts of each case. The Court
reasoned that a nebulous standard is acceptable in cases like Crane for two
reasons."
First, the state ultimately applies its own definition of mental
abnormality. 49 Second, the mental health field is dynamic and imprecise,
leaving courts and practitioners alike with inconsistent concepts of mental
health. 5 ' Thus, guidance, as opposed to a rigid standard, is preferable.
The Court next turned to the question of volition. Like Justice Thomas'
opinion in Hendricks, the Crane majority's interpretation rests heavily on the
assumption that sexual predators cannot control their urges to commit sexual
crimes.'' This presumption leads to the Court's ultimate holding: commitment
in the absence of some showing of volitional impairment offends the
Constitution.

15 2

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia ardently objected to the majority's
reading of the statute largely due to the fact that the same Court had held that the
same statute comported with constitutional requirementsjust five years before.'
Because the statute had been declared constitutional in the first case, Justice
Scalia argued, a finding that it was unconstitutional in the absence of an
additional element, without any confounding events, is simply wrong. 4 Justice
Scalia did not suggest that volitional impairment is irrelevant; rather, he argued
that the volitional element--"difficulty, if not impossibility"--of controlling
behavior is "embraced" within the finding of a mental abnormality.,55 Justice
Scalia's final criticism of the majority opinion was that it provided the trial
courts "not a clue" as to how to charge ajury.56 Furthermore, one need not be
a legal scholar to appreciate problems of a statute previously adjudged
constitutional, that, upon second application, is found constitutionally
insufficient.

148. Id. at413.
149. Id.
150. Id.

151. Id. at414.
152. Id. at 413.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 415 (Scalia,
Id. at 416 (Scalia,
Id. at 420 (Scalia,
Id. at 423 (Scalia,

J.,
J.,
J.,
J.,

dissenting).
dissenting).
dissenting).
dissenting).
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V. DISCUSSION
In the arena of sexual predator jurisprudence, there are few solid truths;
after Crane,there appear to be even fewer. Two truths, however, seem certain.
The first is that liberty rights are not absolute and can be overridden in the
interest of public safety.'57 The second truth is that sexual predators present a
threat to the public safety and, thus, must be confined. 58 The Kansas statute,
which embodies this principal, adds another: 5 9 individuals committed pursuant
to the SVP Act must be confined separately from other committed individuals. "
This practice is reminiscent of quarantine practices prevalent in the medical
community around the turn of the twentieth century. Sexual predators are
similarly deemed too destructive to be in society and too dangerous even to be
integrated with other individuals with mental illnesses. These perceptions,
coupled with the Supreme Court's approach to the volitional impairment issue,
reflect society's feelings about sexual predators: they are pariahs, but they might
not be responsible for their behavior.
The belief that individuals with mental abnormalities, as defined in the
Kansas Act, are unable to control their behavior is evident in both Justice
Thomas' and Justice Breyer's opinions, 6 but there is little evidence of such
impairment outside the Justices' writings. The Hendricks opinion states that the
"added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to
those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond
their control."' 62 The Crane court endorsed this position, stating:
We agree that Hendricks limited its discussion to volitional
disabilities. And that fact is not surprising. The case involved an

157. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1997).
158. See supranotes 9 and 77; see also Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250,262 (2001)
("We acknowledged that not all mental conditions were treatable. For those individuals
with untreatable conditions, however, we explained that there was no federal
constitutional bar to their civil confinement, because the state had an interest in
protecting the public from dangerous individuals with treatable as well as untreatable
conditions.").
159. See supra note 77.
160. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (1994).
161. See supra notes 86-156 and accompanying text.
162. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358; see Winick, supra note 70, at 520 ("Justice
Thomas' repeated references to Hendricks' inability to control his conduct as a
justification for placing sexual predator laws in the same category of civil commitment
statutes previously upheld by the Court strongly suggests that the Court viewed such
uncontrollablility as a constitutional prerequisite for the commitment of dangerous
individuals.").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/9
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individual suffering from pedophilia-a mental abnormality that
critically involves what a lay person might describe as a lack of
control.'63
The opinion provides no evidence of why a lay person would envision
pedophiles as having no volitional control. The accepted definition ofpedophilia
contains no such element." Why the lay opinion should have influence on this
highly technical area of the law is also unclear. Certainly, society is hesitant to
punish individuals who are believed to be unable to control their criminal
behavior. In these situations, punishment would lack its desired deterrent effect.
Acquittal by reason of mental defect statutes are examples of this
phenomenon.1 65 The general understanding is that where an individual has
volitional control and commits a crime, he or she shouldbe punishedbecause the
deviant behavior was the result of a conscious choice. Where an individual has
no control over his or her criminal actions due to a mental condition, however,
the individual is not held responsible for his or her behavior. The distinction is
therefore evident: individuals with no volitional control cannot be held
responsible and, because they have no choice in their actions, cannotbe deterred.
Thus, punishment would be futile. Although these individuals may escape
criminal liability, they are generally confined and treated. Where an individual
is culpable, he or she is punished. Lack of control, conversely, warrants
treatment instead of punishment. The flaw in sexual predator statutes is that the
legislatures sought to strike a balance between these two approaches, but such
a balance is inherently impossible. An offender cannot at once choose to engage
in behavior (culpability) and at the same time be unable to control it (volitional
impairment). The legal system, while struggling with whether to declare sexual
predators mentally unsound or evil, is having it both ways, at the expense of
logic.
Furthermore, the Court's sweeping declaration that sexual predators are
volitionally impaired is precarious at best. There is no empirical support
suggesting that individuals who are diagnosed with one of the paraphilic
disorders lack volitional control.'" It is not suggested that medical and legal
conceptualizations always nest comfortably, but, generally, there should be some
establishedmedical truth behind the legal conceptualization of a disorder. There
appears to be none here. Evidence of an inability to control behavior is absent
inboth the diagnostic tools and the therapeutic literature. 67 Crane'srequirement

163. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 414 (2002).
164. See supra note 24.

165. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 552.040 (2000).
166. Becker & Murphy, supranote 4, at 119; Winick, supranote 70, at 521.
167. See generally Winick, supra note 70; see also sources cited supra note 10.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

21

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 9
1014

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 67

of a separate finding of some degree of inability to control behavior essentially
codifies a faulty understanding of mental health.
Treatment, the Court suggests, is an ancillary purpose of sexual predator
statutory schemes. 6 The Kansas legislature, however, implies that differences
in treatment needs for SVPs and non-SVPs subject to civil commitment as well
as non-SVP prisoners necessitated the promulgation of the Act itself.'69 If
treatment is in fact a goal of the legislation, the legal community's concept of it
needs to be better squared with current psychiatric knowledge. First, the
cognitive and behavioral therapies carry with them the presumption that an
individual, when given the appropriate tools, can control his or her behavior,
although he might not be cured of his abnormality. This assumption is
necessarily counter to the law's requirement that the predator cannot control his
behavior. Where an individual lacks volitional control, treatment tools would be
of no use.
Second, as noted above, a purpose of the SVP legislation, whether ancillary
or primary, is long-term care and treatment that would ultimately prepare a
sexual predator for life in society 7 0 This assumption, too, is counter to what is
generally known in the mental health community-there is no cure. The Court
noted that "[tlhe legislature ... finds that the prognosis for rehabilitating
sexually violent predators in a prison setting is poor, the treatment needs of this
population are very long term and the treatment modalities for this population
are very different than the traditional modalities for people appropriate for [civil]
commitment."'' The Court, thus, acknowledges that there is little hope for
treatment, but declares treatment, coupled with commitment, the only plausible
solution. The legislative language, however, acknowledging that sexual
offenders are of a different kind, seems to envision a solution more like an
acquittal by reason of mental abnormality scheme. It is likely, however, that
society finds predators' acts so utterly abhorrent that relief from culpability
would leave victims' rights unvindicated.
Another problem with the statutory and constitutional treatment scheme of
SVP legislation is that it is gratuitously optimistic. The realities of treatment and
the mental health community's hesitance to label any treatment modality as
successful is incongruous with the intent of the statutes. For instance, the
Marques treatment program discussed supra'7 2 engaged offenders in intensive

168. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 365-67 (1994).
169. Id. at 351 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 351. The Court does not discuss the different treatment modalities.

172. See supranote 37 and accompanying text.
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treatment for two years.' 73 The Kansas statute allows commitment in only oneyear intervals.' 74 Furthermore, even after two years of extensive therapy, the
program was marginally successful in that "the treatment group (those
completing the program) and the volunteer controls havejust about the same rate
175
for new sex offenses."'
Finally, although the HendricksCourt's reasoning may have been flawless
on the issue of whether the statute, as written, was punitive, it appears to have
been applied punitively in at least one instance. The SVP Act, as drafted,
envisions a post-conviction psychiatric analysis pursuant to the Attorney
General's request. 76 Whether the legislature's intent was punitive is
inconsequential; the Supreme Court ofthe United States has declared that SVP
proceedings are civil in nature and comport with constitutional requirements.'"
It is clear from the Kansas Supreme Court's opinion in In re Crane, however,
that the prosecution, unsure that it could sustain a sufficient conviction under the
Kansas Criminal Code, lessened the charges Crane faced and counted on the use
of SVP legislation at the end of his sentence to prolong his detention. 7 The
opinion states:
At the commitment trial, the [video store] victim expressed her
disappointment in the course Crane's prosecution had taken... the
prosecutor had suggested to her that obtaining a guilty plea [to one
count of aggravated sexual battery] "was the best way to go in order
to be able to go down the line" and use the option of the [Sexually
Violent Predator] Act. The victim agreed to the plea bargain because
she believed "it was the only way to make sure that it didn't end
there." The victim testified, "I was not aware that there was an option
of going to trial and going through this or agreeing to the plea and then
using the Sexual Predator Act [sic]. As I... understood, this was the
only option, but if we can get.., some kind of a conviction, then we
can use this option later down the road to make sure he stays off the
179
street.'

173. See supranote 37 and accompanying text.
174. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08 (1994).
175. Marques, supranote 37, at 444. Marques notes, however, that sampling error
may have skewed this result. For a review of actuarial recidivism rates, see Becker &
Murphy, supranote 4, at 124-29.
176. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a04(a) (1994).

177. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).
178. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285,287 (Kan. 2000), vacatedsubnom. Kansas v. Crane,
534 U.S. 407 (2002).
179. Id.
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Nevertheless, the issue raised on transfer to the Kansas Supreme Court was
"whether it is constitutionally permissible to commit Crane as a sexual predator
absent a showing that he was unable to control his dangerous behavior."'"" No
matter what the vehicle, the application of the statute in this case was punitive.
Simply put, the prosecutor here used the SVP Act to circumvent the criminal
process and relied on the Act to sustain detainment. Clearly, this is not what the
Supreme Court had in mind when it ruled in Hendricks.
One possible solution to all of these problems is that the adjudication of an
individual as a sexually violent predator should occur at the trial phase.
Although there is no perfect solution to this imperfect problem, this approach
may be less offensive to science and the law. This proposal is based upon the
assumption that, regardless of whether sexual predators have a volitional
impairment, they fall outside the traditional ambit of criminal law. Nevertheless,
their dangerousness suggests that perhaps the criminal justice system is better
equipped to contain them. The same year the Kansas legislature breathed life
into the SVP Act, the United States Supreme Court approved charging a jury
with finding a likelihood of future dangerousness at deliberation.' It stated:
Arguments relating to a defendant's future dangerousness ordinarily
would be inappropriate at the guilt phase of a trial, as the jury is not
free to convict a defendant simply because he poses a future danger,
nor is a defendant's future dangerousness likely relevant to the
question whether each element of an alleged offense has been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. But where the jury has sentencing
responsibilities in a capital trial, many issues that are irrelevant to the
guilt-innocence determinating step into the foreground and require
consideration at the sentencing phase. The defendant's character,
prior criminal history, mental capacity, background, and age are just
a few of the many factors, in addition to future dangerousness, that a
18 2
jury may consider in fixing the appropriate punishment.
This approach, though applied in a capital case, is relevant here. Certainly it is
likely that the jury would be unforgiving of an individual who victimizes
individuals, many of whom are children. Still, there is little meaningful
distinction between an extended incarceration and prolonged commitment in a
facility where the efficacy of treatment is questionable. There could be
safeguards in this approach as well. The jury could first make its determination
of guilt or acquittal of the sex crime and return its verdict. Then, at sentencing,

180. Id.
181. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 162 (1994).
182. Id. at 163.
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the prosecution could introduce expert testimony about future dangerousness.
Under Simmons, this proposal is constitutional and would serve the same
ultimate purpose as the SVP laws: confining predators in the interest of public
safety. The SVP approach, on the other hand, places undue weight on volitional
impairment and too little emphasis on the ultimate goal-preservation ofpublic
safety.
VI. CONCLUSION
Incarceration and civil commitment make strange bedfellows. The legal
system's twisting of general principles of both law and logic is indicative of a
true struggle that has haunted the legal system in the area of mental health.' It
must be recognized, however, that new systems are fraught with uncertainty in
early stages. Here, that uncertainty comes at the cost of offenders' freedom, and
while no one suggests that a predator be released, legislatures and courts should
strive to understand the clinical implications of their language.
JULIA C. WALKER

183. Dr. Sally Satel, psychiatrist and fellow at the American Enterprise Institute
discussed this conceptual error with regard to Andrea Yates, the Houston mother
convicted of killing her children. "The law is impervious to these subtleties. Thejury's
directive... applies a mistaken conceptual framework to the mindset of a psychotic."
Sally Satel, Editorial, It's Crazy to Execute the Insane,WALL ST. J., March 14, 2002, at
A4.
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